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The Qibya massacre, known in Israel as Operation Shoshana, and also known as the Qibya incident, was a reprisal operation that occurred in October 1953 when Israeli troops under Ariel Sharon attacked the village of Qibya in the West Bank. At least sixty-nine Palestinian Arab villagers were killed. Forty-five houses, a school, and a mosque were destroyed.〔Benny Morris, ''Israel's Border Wars, 1949–1956: Arab Infiltration, Israeli Retaliation and the Countdown to the Suez War'', Oxford University Press, 1993, pp. 258–9.〕 The attack followed cross-border raids from the Jordanian occupied West Bank and Israeli reprisals, in particular, the attack on Qibya was a response to the Yehud attack in which an Israeli woman and her two children were murdered in their home.〔 The act was condemned by the U.S. State Department, the UN Security Council, and by Jewish communities worldwide. The State Department described the raid as "shocking", and used the occasion to confirm publicly that economic aid to Israel had been suspended previously, for other non-compliance regarding the 1949 Armistice Agreements. The operation was codenamed Operation Shoshana by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF). It was carried out by two Israeli units at night: a paratroop company and Unit 101, a special forces unit of the IDF. ==Background== The attack took place in the context of border clashes between Israel and neighbouring states, which had begun almost immediately after the signing of the 1949 Armistice Agreements. Along the 1949 armistice line, infiltrations, armed or otherwise, were frequent from both sides. Many infiltrations from Jordanian territory in the West Bank consisted of unarmed Palestinian refugees attempting to rejoin their families. During 1948–49, most of the infiltrators crossed the borders to harvest crops left behind, to plant new crops in their abandoned lands, or to retrieve goods. Many others came to resettle in their old villages or elsewhere inside Israel, or to visit relatives, or simply to get a glimpse of their abandoned homes and fields. During the following years the vast majority came to steal crops, irrigation pipes, farm animals, or other property belonging to settlers, or to graze their flocks. Some engaged in smuggling goods or mail—certain items, such as Bedouin clothing, were often unavailable in Israel, and there were no postal services between Israel and the Arab states. Others moved through Israeli territory in order to reach other Arab countries, most frequently from the Gaza Strip to the West Bank. Most of the infiltrators were unarmed individuals, though it appears that the proportion who came armed and in groups steadily increased after 1950. Half of Jordan's prison population at the time consisted of people arrested for attempting to return to, or illegally enter, Israeli territory, but the number of complaints filed by Israel over infiltrations from the West Bank show a considerable reduction, from 233 in the first nine months of 1952, to 172 for the same period in 1953, immediately before the attack. This marked reduction was in good part the result of increased Jordanian efficiency in patrolling.〔(【引用サイトリンク】url=http://domino.un.org/unispal.nsf/9a798adbf322aff38525617b006d88d7/eef5490a45758c7c05256727006e0e6c )〕 Between June 1949 and the end of 1952, a total of 57 Israelis, mostly civilians, were killed by Palestinian infiltrators from the Jordanian West Bank. The Israeli death toll for the first nine months of 1953 was 32.〔(Which Came First- Terrorism or Occupation – Major Arab Terrorist Attacks against Israelis Prior to the 1967 Six-Day War )〕 Over roughly the same time (November 1950 – November 1953), the Mixed Armistice Commission condemned Israeli raids 44 times.〔 For the same period, 1949–1953, Jordan maintained that it alone suffered 629 killed and injured from Israeli incursions and cross-border bombings.〔 UN sources for the period, based on the documentation at General Bennike's disposal (prepared by Commander E H Hutchison USNR),〔Commander E H Hutchison USNR "Violent Truce: A Military Observer Looks at the Arab-Israeli Conflict 1951–1955” Chapter XI A Survey of the Whole Conflict p. 90-100〕 lower both estimates〔(【引用サイトリンク】url=http://unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/6BD4ECB150D067A5052567240073C87F )〕 Over the year leading up to the raid, Israeli forces and civilians had conducted many punitive expeditions, causing destruction of infrastructure and crops and many civilian casualties against Palestinian villages, with Latrun, Falameh, Rantis, Qalqiliya, Khirbet al-Deir, Khirbet Rasm Nofal, Khirbet Beit Emin, Qatanna, Wadi Fukin, Idhna, and Surif being the most notable examples.〔 Meanwhile, Palestinian guerilla raids into Israel continued. Over a two-week period in late May and early June, four raids by Palestinian fedayeen killed 3 and wounded 6 people in Israel, at Beit Arif, Beit Nabala, Tirat Yehuda and Kfar Hess which, according to the UN, greatly concerned both the Israeli and Jordanian governments.〔(【引用サイトリンク】url=http://unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/017EEFB458011C9D05256722005E5499 )〕 The specific incident which the Israeli government used to justify the assault on Qibya occurred on 12 October 1953, when a Jewish woman, Suzanne Kinyas, and her two children were killed by a grenade thrown into their house in the Israeli town of Yehud, some inside of the Green Line. The attack initially drew a sharp rebuke to Jordan from the Mixed Armistice Commission.〔 The Israeli government immediately claimed that the murders were perpetrated by Palestinian infiltrators, a charge queried by Jordanian officials, who were skeptical, and who offered to collaborate with Israel in order to apprehend the guilty parties, whoever and wherever they were. Moshe Sharett said later that "the Commander of the Jordan Legion, Glubb Pasha, had asked for police bloodhounds to cross over from Israel to track down the Yahud attackers".〔''Jerusalem Post'', 31 October 1965)〕 On the other hand, some weeks later, while assisting a United Nations and Jordanian team following the tracks of the person(s) who on 1 November had blown up a water-line in Jordanian territory supplying the Arab quarter of Jerusalem, tracks that led to the Scopus fence, the Israeli inspector delegated to the team denied them permission to enter the Jewish area around Mount Scopus and prosecute their investigation.〔 For the first time, Israel accepted Jordan's offer of assistance and the tracks of the perpetrator were traced to a point 1400m over the border, to a road near Rantis, but dried up there. The United Nations observer team's investigation failed to find any evidence indicating who committed the crime, and the Jordanian delegate to the Mixed Commission condemned the act in strong language on 14 October.〔Commander E H Hutchison USNR "Violent Truce: A Military Observer Looks at the Arab-Israeli Conflict 1951–1955” (Acting Chairman of the HJKIMAC), Appendix B〕〔Avi Shlaim, ''The Iron Wall'', pp 90–93〕 The Chief of Staff of the Arab Legion in Amman flew to Jerusalem to ask that no retaliatory actions take place that might compromise Jordanian investigations underway on their side of the border.〔 According to the former Time correspondent to Jerusalem, Donald Neff, the decisive calculation was as follows: Force had to be used to demonstrate to the Arabs that Israel was in the Middle East to stay, Ben Gurion believed, and to that end he felt strongly that his retaliatory policy had to be continued.〔Donald Neff, ''Warriors at Suez: Eisenhower Takes America into the Middle East.'' The Linden Press/Simon & Schuster. New York, 1981, pp. 48–50):〕Defense Minister Pinhas Lavon gave the order, in coordination with Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion. The Israeli elected governing cabinet was not informed, and though Foreign Affairs Minister Moshe Sharett was privy to prior deliberations on whether or not such a punitive raid ought to be conducted, he expressed strong disapproval of the proposal, and was deeply shocked when informed of the outcome.〔In Sharett's diary we read: (1)'I told Lavon that this () will be a grave error, and recalled, citing various precedents, that it was never proved that reprisal actions serve their declared purpose. Lavon smiled ... and kept to his own idea.... Ben Gurion, he said, didn't share my view.' (14 October 1953, p.37) (2) 'I must underline that when I opposed the action I didn't even remotely suspect such a bloodbath. I thought that I was opposing one of those actions which have become a routine in the past. Had I even remotely suspected that such a massacre was to be held, I would have raised real hell. (16 October 1953,p. 44)' cited Livia Rokach, ''Israel's Sacred Terrorism,'' AAUG Press, Belmont, Massachusetts, 3rd ed.1986.〕 抄文引用元・出典: フリー百科事典『 ウィキペディア（Wikipedia）』 ■ウィキペディアで「Qibya massacre」の詳細全文を読む スポンサード リンク
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